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NEW READINGS OF OLD LAW.
When the principle upon which a law rests is unchanging.
unchangeable, then that law has no age; it was never young, it
can never grow old. For this reason, only that is old in the law
which is changing and changeable-that which is not perma-
nent because not a part of the unaging truth. So if we here
speak of "old law" it must be either of that which was ephemeral
and has, therefore, passed away, or of that which is unchanging
and for that reason should not properly be called old. Yet we
must use language as we find it. The law which we are to in-
vestigate is "old" in the customary sense of having been set
down in old records or in printed pages some centuries ago. But
let us not think of it as old in any derogation of its worth; let
us merely think of it as "rich with the hoar of time," and as
bearing in its withered shell the live seed of the present "law.
Sometimes this very "hoar of time" has so covered the law as
to give it a semblance of something it is not, and, strange as
this may seem, this is what has happened to one of the best
known institutions of our law; one of the most valued and most
boasted of in all its history. We have gloried in the right to
"be tried by our peers"; we have been told that our liberties have
been safeguarded, our rights protected, by means of this institu-
tion, and then we are also told that this very institution in the
course of its eventful history has "suffered a sea change," and
from being a jury which spoke of its own knowledge of the facts
of which it was to judge, has come to be a jury whose one
virtue is to know nothing of those facts. Are either of these
propositions correct?
In the old time the jurors were the witnesses "this doctrine
has in our own days become a commonplace. For the purpose
of popular exposition it is true enough. Nevertheless it does not
quite hit the truth." 1 As a rule we may rely upon the authors
just cited to know whether a proposition hits the truth or not.
In the case of the jury, however, they have never given us what
'Pollock & Maitland, History of English Law (2d Ed.), Vol. 2, p. 6z.
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would have been of immense value-a connected statement as
to the real functions or the true development of the jury. At
first reading one may almost think that they are on the side of
those who hold that the earliest jury was a very different thing
from the jury of today, and that they are to be counted upon
the side of those who look upon the jury of that day merely
as sworn witnesses who spoke from their own knowledge and
their own knowledge only, and who did not, as do our jurors
today, have before them the testimony of other witnesses and
the knowledge to be gathered from persons who have really a
first hand knowledge of the facts about which they, speak, as
many of the jurors do not.2 But after gathering such quota-
tions as that just cited from the four comers of their history it
becomes plain that Mr. Pollock and Mr. Maitland saw and
acknowledged the fact that the jurors of that period did depend
on testimony; did not speak their judgment from their own
knowledge simply. When one gives a serious attention to the
great writers on legal history it becomes a surprise that this false
theory ever grew up at all. for they are free to state their own
thoughts that the jurors "took testimony." Mr. Luke Owen
Pike, writing in x885, says, "But their testimony must com-
monly have been very much of the nature of hearsay evidence.
They were not supposed to speak necessarily from their own
knowledge, 'de lour ascient,' as the jurors of the assize were, but
ex credulitate." 2
Mr. Thayer says :4 "Always, as we see, there had been.
in some cases, a mingling of the jury with witnesses in their
private deliberations." Mr. Thayer, like many others, felt that
somehow the change had been great from the old process to the
new. "How and when did this great change of introducing.
witnesses to testify publicly to the jury come about? No one
as yet can tell with exactness." 3 The strange thing is that with
the history of the law being spread out before them by means
'Pollock & Maitland, Hist. of Eng. Law (2d Ed.), Vol. , p. 62&
1Y. B. 2-13, Edw. 111, Preface, p. IvL
'Thayer, Evidence, p. 12.
"Thayer. Evidence, p. i a.
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of their own indefatigable labors, men like Mr. Thayer should
feel that here was still a great mystery. He goes on to say,
"There was certainly one sort of trial in which witnesses were
publicly examined before the jurors at an early period." ' He
cites a Year Book case of 1371-75 in which the persons chal-
lenged were sworn to give evidence to the jurors. T But he does
not give us any close examination of the still earlier cases which
are of the most interest to us, if we are to learn what really hap-
pened in the beginning of the life of the jury. We must get
back to the first cases'in which we do find witnesses coming in to
testify. All our authors concede--if concede is the word, since
they were only anxious for the truth-that witnesses are com-
bined with the jury to prove deeds at a very early period,
"From the beginning of our records," Thayer says:S He cites
Glanvill for this. "In posteriore vero casu,,poterit in curia
carta ipsa per aliquem idoneum testem." Evidently not only
those subscribing to the charter, as is sometimes said, but any
"proper witness." There seems little need to cite cases where
such deeds are brought forth as evidence, with the subscribing
witnesses thereto. For example, the whole Placita Quo War-
ranto, is full of them.' On page three of this book will be
found the case of the "Abbaressee de Fonte Eboraudi," where
there are many questions asked and a witness is introduced, "-Et
hoc idcrn testatem est per Thorn de Brahy." This plea was
held in 1285-86. And so all through these cases; everywhere
the charter is brought in as evidence and frequently the witnesses
to confirm it. We have even earlier cases from Bracton's Note
Book, that mine of treasure for the old law. Witnesses who
were named in a charter are produced in a case in 1224.10 In
1227 four witnesses also named in the charter testified upon
their oath that they were present when the charter was made,
but as to the other charter which was produced they knew noth-
1lb., p. 123.
1b, p. 124.
'Thayer. Evidence. p. 97; Glanvill, Lib. X. C. 12.
* Placita de Quo Warranto, Temp., Edw. 1, 11, I1 (Rec. Com. MSi).
" Bracton. Xote Book, 2a.
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ing.1 In the same year the litigants rest their case upon the
two witnesses in a charter. The report of the case ends with the
citation of the witnesses to appear.12 There is an interesting
case in 1231, in which the proceedings are very modern, and a
number of witnesses give their testimony.'3
In the Placita Corone de Comitatu Gloucesirie, for the fifth
year of the reign of King Henry the Third (1221) we find Mait-
land saying that while the jurors had "sometimes really seen
the crime, more often their knewledge must have been infer-
ential." 4 "Occasionally other persons who are not jurors give
evidence." 15 For instance Maitland cites the case of John Spire-
win, who killed Peter the son of Walter with a knife while they
were playing "ad talos," and, being taken, Richard the forester,
bailiff of the king, said that the two were playing together, and
"a discord arose between them" so that Peter was killed. Plainly
a witness and a good one- e In the next case cited the Comes
Marascallus is present and testifies that the accused was absent
at the time of the murder, being in "exercita Lodowicy apid
Londomiam." So he gives pledges t? appear to hear judgment
at Westminster."7 In another case of murder, five men, whose
names are given "ai pluries alii" who were present at the time
of the murder give their testimony, and the four vills testify
to the facts also. After all this the jurors say that the accused
is guilty "et ideo suspendatur." Is In the case of Roger the Frank-
lin,1 9 the coroners, the twelve jurors and the four vills "omnes
una voce dicunt" that the accused is guilty. The case of Rich-
ard the Butler, one is tempted to transcribe as a whole since
it is almost a complete romance in itself. Here the accused-
a woman-is questioned and speaks for herself. Mr. Maitland at
=lb., 350.
lb., 25-.
Ib., 5a.
"Maitland, Introduction, p. xl.
"lb., p. xli.
31b., Case z8g.
0 b., Case 2s4.
lb., Case 394.
1b., Case 414.
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that time seemed to regard this as unusual. In later years he
would surely not have done so, for we have innumerable cases in
which the accused tells his story briefly or at length as the case
may be. The jurors think that she purchased the death of her
husband, but suspend judgment for a month."'a One may be
allowed to suspect that more evidence was desired. It is in
the introduction to this very volume of the Please of the Crown
for the County of Gloucester, that Mr. Maitland formulates the
theory that the fbur vills mentioned above were the germ of the
present jury system. Later 2 0 he seems to repudiate this view,
but in writing on the jury and the taking of testimony before it,
Mr. Maitland is always writing with other thoughts in his mind;
he is working out a theory of evidence; of the origin of the
jury; of ihe specific pleas of which he is treating; he never took
up the specific subject of the development of the jury, but when-
ever he touched upon it he had illuminating ideas. These four
vills interested him as they have interested many. They are
the community witnesses who have also been considered as the
germ of the jury: probably with very much truth, but that is not
now our precise object. They interest us here chiefly as they lead
up to what seems to be a fundamental error in the treatment of
the jury by the historical writers upon it. From it appears to
grow the confusion created by the phrase "the country." Mait-
land remarked it, but appears unconscious that he did so. In
speaking 'of a verdict of a "pays" a country, a community, a
neighborhood, he says "we may perceive what we may not
handle," which is pre-eminently what genius does; those who
come after may do the handling. He gives us the clue which
' we may follow. "The voice of the twelve men is deemed to be
the voice of the countryside, often the voice of some hundred or
other district which is more than a district, which is a com-
munity." This is just what it was-not its own voice, the voice
of the jurata. It was the voice of the four vills; of the neigh-
borhood. When people appealed to the "pays" they did not
1Ib, Case si.
" P. & X. Hist. of Eng. Law, VoL 2, p. 649, a. 4.
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mean as most of us have been taught, that they appealed to the
jury; not at first at all events-not for a long time, not until
the phrase had crystallized through long custom and representa-
tion had had to take the place of the entire country. They really
meant what they said when they appealed to the country. They
"put themselves" on the country which knew them; which knew
the facts. At first it may have been literally the whole country;
that is the whole neighborhood which came to testify before the
twelve; there is a theory that this is so.21 And we shall see
that there are cases reported in which the "whole country"
testifies. We are not absolutely sure, of course, that this must
be taken to mean literally all the neighbors; it may mean that a
large number sent by the countryside so testified. But it ap-
parently means that the people who could get to the court and
who knew anything about the case went before the jurors and
told what they knew. These people, or these four vills, do not
always testify to *the same thing; they do not speak in concert;
frequently one says one thing, another another thing. Some-
times one will know a good deal and say so; the second will
know nothing; the third will add some facts to the knowledge
of the first, or differ in regard to them. It is all the voice of the
countryside; its own voice as a whole, or speaking through the
voice of those whom they have sent to speak for them. They
tell the jurors 'what they know; the jurors should know also of
their own knowledge, if they can, but many times the knowledge
is impossible for them at first hand. "The twelve representatives
of the country will certainly not be able to answer if they may
speak only of what they have seen with their own eyes. 2  For
example Maitland gives case 628 in the Note Book, "Et Ricardus
vcnit et dicit quod omni tempore a conquestu Anglic ibi comrnu-
narn habuit . . . et inde ponif se super palriam." The thoughts
of the jury must have been long, long, thoughts if they could
go back from 1231 to io66, of their own memory! According to
Glanvill the recognitors of the grand assize may base their ver-
" 17 L J. 452 (1862).
I P. & I. Hist. of Eng. Law, VoL a, p. 624.
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dict upon what their fathers have told them, but jurors (in the
narrower sense) should speak "de proprio visu et auditu."'2
The phrase is in Glanvill, "de qui probare possunt de Viso SUo
proprio et auditu," but their "own sight and hearing" is not
necessarily the sight and hearing of the jurors themselves; that
is simply read into the phrase by our accustomed thought. Those
who by their own sight and hearing can prove anything are most
often not the jurors, but those who can inform the jurors-the
"pays" upon which the people rely as Twiss' translation of Brac-
ton puts it "upon the testimony and proof of those, who can
prove by their own sight and hearing."2 4 "Some of the verdicts
that are given must be founded upon hearsay and floating tradi-
tion."23
When writing about the "sworn inquest" and the early his-
tory of the trial by jury (in regard to its origin chiefly), Pol-
lock and Maitland say, " a jury is not summoned until the liti-
gants in their pleadings have agreed to take the testimony'of
'the country' about some matter of fact." 26 People did not go
to the country unless they agreed to do so. Indeed, the man
who knew he was guilty generally refused this procedure. His
only course then was to abjure the realm. In reading these cases
one feels that the roads to the seaports must have been filled with
these people who could not trust a verdict of their neighbors
as to their deeds. They often wander out of the straight road;
the Year Books of a later period-for all this is back of Year
Book law-will often tell of their being brought back and ap-
prehended. Such a man knew that if the sworn twelve did not
know all about him of their own knowledge all the country.
side will be eager to give them all the knowledge in their pos-
session; when the jury give their verdict they will know all the
facts so far as he has not been able to conceal them. After a
while if he feels that he will be allowed to come back he sues for
a pardon from the king, and if he can pay well for it, gets it, and
" Bracton, f. 317, b.
"Twiss' Trans. of Bracton, VoL S, p. 3-
"P. & X His of Eng. Law, VoL 2, p. 624. See aio note 4.
"P. & M. Hist. of Eng. Law. Vol. , p. z49.
114 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
resumes life in the old place once more. Sometimes the history
of this pardon shows the supposed malefactor in a very different
light from that in which he is at first presented. 2T. It is curious
to see, in this case, how difficult it is to convince the jurors that
the accused was actually pardoned. It was a time when the
valuable "charters of pardon" were very frequently forged.
The Pleas of the Crown 28 show us many instances of wit-
nesses coming before the jury. One case shows the coroner and
the whole country testifying before the jurors.2s This is in
1202. Another case in the same year shows the sheriff and the-
whole county testifying. 0 A later case, x2zx, makes all the
jurors, both of the town and the hundred, say that the accused
is not guilty, and the county records are used as evidence s ' In
a case in 1225 the "knights of this hundred and those of Taun-
ton Hundred, and others and the townships come and say upon
their oaths that they suspect these men, and indeed the whole
township [of Sampford] except four men, to wit, Richard of
the Wood, William Breckeherte, Stephen Reeve, the elder, Warin
the Tailor, and Richard One-eye, say precisely that when they
were pursuing their lord to slay him, he fled to the church and
would have entered it, but the chaplain shut the door, and he
dared not enter, and then they slew him and put him in his house
and set fire to it." This is all sworn testimony before the jurors,
after all of the accused have put themselves upon the countryU2
Another case of the same year differs from the cases already
cited because the accused produce a "whole tithing" as wit-
nesses who give their testimony to the jurors5 3 A case in 1220
should not perhaps be considered as it is not the ordinary pro-
cedure before a jury, but it is very interesting, as it shows more
clearly than any of the others the method of taking the testi-
3 Pleas of the Crown for the County of Gloucester, Case 36
Selden Soc., VoL L
yleas of the Crown, SeL Soc. Vol. x, Case 23.
I, Case 40
"lb., Case x6a.
011t, Case 19.
",., Case z4.
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mony of the witnesses. Eight men of Waltham, how chosen
we do not know, are sworn and testify to the truth, "as they
believe, for all the countryside say so." "The men of Cheshunt"
(the number is not given, but we may assume eight), do not
know what the men of Waltham know, but testify, being sworn,
to another set of facts. The eight mep of Wormley, being
sworn, know still other things. The eight men of Enfield, "well
believe"--certain facts, "foi all men say so." We have the four
vills here represented by eight men each, and they all give sworn
testimony as to the facts: as complete a body of evidence as
could be desired save for the element of hearsay, which is not so
much hearsay as cumulative evidence, as it is evident that they
have given great attention to getting at all the facts in the case."
Glanvill cites this case, as the case of Elias Pigon, and says that
it came before Martin Pateshull. s Fom the manner of its
recording and the citation by Glanvill it was probably thought
an important case.
In a Cornish Eyre of x2o,26 "The jurors being asked,
say they suspect him of it; the whole country likewise suspect
him." In case 6, 3 the four neighboring townships which are
sworn, suspect two men of burglary. We should note that in
this and many other cases the testimony is sworn testimony,
for it is generally stated that such evidence was given without
the formality of an oath.'8 In other cases the coroners and the
whole country testify,3  "Those who are sent by the sheriff,'
"And the jury and the whole neighborhood suspect him of that
death.", 1 "Afterwards it was testified by others" (than the
jury) "that R. slew her."' 2 In another case the jurors say the
T Ib, Case z19,
MGlanvill, f.zEr, b. Also P. & Mst. of Eng. Law, Vol2, p 63&
Se. Soc, Pleas of the Crown, Case L
SPage 3.
1P. & IL Hist. of Ezg. Law, Vol. 2, p. 542.
" Pleas of the Crown, Se. Soc.. VoL x, Case 23.
01b., Case 45.
'lb., Case 68.
1lb., Case 127.
116 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REV.IEW
accused is guilty, but the four townships "know naught of him
but good." 3 There is a difference of opinion in the next
case,44 and the townships do not agree at first; at length all
agreed that all the accused were guilty.
In a case in I22545 the king's-baliff testifies that the-accused
confessed the deed, before him and before many others, and he
produced a whole tithing which testified the same. The accused
testifies for himself (this is another case in which the accused
is a witness for himself) and accuses another man of the mur-
der. But the twelve jurors decide that the accused is guilty
and "say so in so many words," ("precisi dicunt").
In Bracton's Note Book we find a case 4 in which the jury
and the four vills come, but the accused will not put himself on
the country, but all the country and the neighborhood testify,
"quod latro est."
It seems unnecessary to go on citing cases which are only
examples taken here and there from among the many on record.
Much more work must be done, of course, to clear up the pro-
cedure, to show just how the four vills, or later their repre-
sentatives, came to testify. Various theories are already pro-
pounded; the community witness and the interesting history
which is to be written about him; the coroner's witness, whom
Mr. Gross47 thinks may be the forerunner of the later witnesses
before juries. But to go into that part of the story is indeed
another matter involving the entire history of the jury, and
perhaps bringing up again the controversy; as yet unsettled, as
to the origin of the jury and of its Anglo-Saxon or Frankish
birth. In this very inadequate sketch all we are trying to do is to
show that the earliest juries of which we have records were not
the sole witnesses as to the facts; that although they may have
been witnesses they also heard other witnesses; took testimony-
"lb., Case i6f.
"lb., Case z63.
"lb., Case 84.
" Brac. N. B, Case z3.
-Introduction to the Coroner's Rolls, SeL Soc., Vol. 9; p. xxxiv.
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sworn testimony-and also were expected to learn from docu-
ments and the recollections of those whose memories could sup-
plement their own.
But, it is always said, the jurors were expected to know- of
their own knowledge, even if they supplemented that knowledge
by that of community and individual witnesses, "other than the
jury." And it is assumed at the same time that the jury of today
do not do this; they are selected only because they know nothing
of what has occurred, and the less they know of the facts the
better.
Again, is this so? The early jury came from the. vicinage.
Why? Because those of the vicinage knew what had been going
on. Exactly. The jury of today, comes as well from the vicin-
age. Why? Is it wholly a matter of custom? Have no new
laws been made as to juries? Are we still on all points subject
to the old custom? Then why retain this custom, except for
the fact that men or women should be tried by those who know
them, or if not near enough for personal knowledge, know the
circumstances under which they live; know why a thing would
be a provocation, or.a temptation here, and not there, under one
set of circumstances and not under another. The four vills of
our early period must have been farther from each other than
any place in a county can be from any other place in a county
today. Not because distances were different but because means
of communication, and means of disseminating knowledge have
grown so enormously that we are better aware of facts and cir-
cumstances five hundred miles away today than those of that
distant day were aware of what was going on five miles away.
It may seem easy to concede this, because after all the real
difference is in the fact that the juror of today must be at all
points free -f suspicion of any partiality; he must be absolutely
free from all bias or he can be challenged and refused by the
accused or by either party. But in those old days this is-also
absolutely truer The juror must not be "suspicious," he must be
one who would give his testimony absolutely without bias. This
is shown by both the cases and by the statute, which says that
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sheriffs and bailiffs shall "nzittent en teles enquests jures le plus
procheins le plus sufwants, et mcynes suspccenous."4
See also Coke, "Every juror must have two mosts, and one
least, viz.: most neere, most sufficient, and least suspicious." "
This shows that the jurors, witnesses though they might
be, were expected to be impartial witnesses; they must be chosen
from those of the vicinage who could be relied on to really "try"
the case and give a verdict in accordance with the facts as they
and their neighbors knew them. Is not that practically the jury
of today? But it is said that the jury of today are not witnesses;
they cannot be called to testify in any case, therefore there is
certainly one very important way in which the modem jury is
unlike the old jury; somewhere and sometime there must have
been a period of departure from the old ways when this very
great change from a jury which were witness to a jury which
under no circumstances are witnesses came about. But is it
true that the juror of today can never be a witness and never is
a witness? The answer, of course, of anyone who has ever
taken the pains to examine into the question, must be that it is
not true; that the original character of the-juror has not even
in this respect undergone that wonderful change which is so
frequently referred to. He has not lost this early prerogative,
and there is no known time in which he has not been allowed
to testify as to facts within his knowledge; indeed he must "sub-
mit to be publicly sworn and examined." This entire passage
from the note by Mr. Wharton had best be given here. "A juror
on trial, who has knowledge of any material facts, must give
notice, so that he may be sworn and examined, and cross-exam-
ined . . . each juryman may apply to the subject before him that
general knowledge which any man may be supposed to have, yet
if he be personally acquainted with any material particular fact,
he is not permitted to mention the circumstances privately to his
fellows, but he must submit to be publicly sworn and ex-
'Articuli Suptr Chartas, 28 Ed. t, Stat. & c. iz.
0 Coke Second Institute, p. 56t. Note to cap. ix, Arliculi Suptr Charlas,
vut. 4
NEW READINGS OF OLD LAW
amined."'5 "Though the jury may use their general knowledge
on the subject of any question before them, yet, if any juror has
a particular knowledge as to which he can testify, he must be
sworn as a witness."' "Let it be distinctly said that jurors are
not incompetent witnesses in either criminal or civil issues. They
have no interest that disqualifies, and there is no rule of public
policy that excludes them .... He, like all other witnesses, must
'confront' ihe accused, that is, be examined in the presence of
the accused, and be subject to cross-examination; but he is not
disqualified to be a witness."' 2  "It has always been regarded
as proper that a juror having any relevant knowledge should be
called as a witness, returning to the box after completing his
testimony.""2 This principle has been embodied in many of the
codes of the states, for convenience of reference it may be as
well to refer to the examples cited by Mr. Wigmore in his
treatise on evidence."4 These authorities are merely given be-
cause, as before stated, there seems to be a general vague way of
referring to.tle jury as having entirely lost their original chat-
...acter of witnesses. On this point the chief changes seems to be
that they could in the early days collect testimony wherever they
found it; while today the custom is to have the testimony all
sworn to before the jury. The real difference seems small since
the valuable testimony, as I think has been shown, was always
sworn to, as it is now, and it cannot be assumed that a juror
coming from a county in which the action took place is liely to
know less of a case today, when the reading of newspapers is so
general, than in the past when every fact had to be wommuni-
cated by passing from mouth to mouth. The sort of knowledge
that he must not have now, and that he was forbidden to have
then, was and is the sort that prejudges and prejudged the case
in the juror's mind.
In what way then-what radical way, is the jury of today
"Wharton: Evidence, (3d Ed.), 888, Vol i, See. 602.
"Greenleaf: Evidence, (16th Ed.), z899, Vol. r, p. 39&S Sec 254, C.
"Houser v. Com, S Pa. 332 (338), z865, Woodward, C. J.
"Wigmore: Evidence, Vol. 3, Sec. z91, and cases cited in note.
"lb., Vol. 3. See. i8oo.
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so different from that original jury, (or the very early jury, since
we may not as yet get back to the original), that, which sat in the
eleven hundreds, in the twelve hundreds and the later juries of
the Year Books? We have not touched upon these latter records
because they are too near our own times, and there is not time
and space to cite the many interesting cases to be found in them.
The great and subtile change, if there were one, came earlier
than those records, old as they are. If we find these earlier
records show us a jury which are judges of the facts, as they are
now, if they hear witnesses, sworn to tell the truth, as they do
now; if their verdict was a verdict upon the facts as known to
them and as testified to them by witnesses, where is the radical
difference between the juror of old and the juror of today?
There are differences, it is true, subtile differences, but these it
would seem after examining the cases, are those of time and
place rather than of principle. The vicinage of that day and of
this must mean something different since we have annihilated
both time and space in many ways; we have brought men to-
gether and made them neighbors when they would have been
"foreigners" in those days. We learn to know a neighborhood's
mind at the breakfast table, better than the man of the twelve
hundreds could know that mind in a week's time. But these are
only mechanical, superficial changes. The intention in selecting
a jury is the same; to get the judgment of a man's neighbors,
those who can know best about him, and who know best the cir-
cumstances surrounding the special facts, and yet who are "un-
suspected" of any bias, who will say truly what they thiik and
who are free to think straight about them. They will proceed
to acquire what knowledge they can get from sworn witnesse,
but they can also as they did then, rely upon their general knowl-
edge. And after all this they are asked to "say precisely" what
they have found. This precise saying of the old jury is the
guilty or not guilty of today. Or, if it is a civil case, the jury
would say then as now that the horse or the cart, or the house or
the charter, belonged to one or the other, or that one should do
this or that justice to the other.
Since no man has as yet put his finger on the time of change,
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or the method of change, or even knows exactly what the change
was or is, why not look through this vague mist of minor differ.
ences, and so looking, find that it is but mirage after all? Or,
brush away this dust that has gathered over these old records
and by so doing read clearly that which has been dimly per-
ceived.
Of what importance is this difference? It vindicates the
place of the jury in our law; it shows what it did for man in
the old days-what it really did, not what we who think we
have been reading the history of the law have come to think it
did. It sets aside the criticism of the jury of the past as no
real jury, merely a set of men who said what they were asked
to say and had not much choice in the saying; it shows that
they were judges as they are today, and not merely witnesses; it
shows that the familiar taunt that the jury of today is expected
to be utterly senseless, because it is expected to be "unsuspected"
of malice or bias, is not a thing grown up out of a decadent state
of the country or the decay of the jury, but is an integral part
of the jury duty, made a mock of by the incompetence or design
of the modern lawyer in some cases, perhaps, but a perfectly
reasonable and honorably ancient rule for the good of the com-
munity. It shows that the idea that this ancient institution of
ours is not an ancient institution since it is no true descendant
of the old jury, is not true; that this modern jury of ours is no
inverted or perverted growth from some thing that was vastly
different, whether better or worse, than that which we now have.
It might show much more if there were time here to trace it out;
it will show much more when carefully examined. From its
history may be read the origin and growth of the mutual dis-
trust of judge and jury; of the feeling of the judges that the
jury with their "lay minds" cannot be trusted with the judgment
of facts which such minds are too low to comprehend. Of the
feeling of the juror that the justices are not nearly "lay" enough
to understand the mind of the average individual, which he yet
does not feel is so low as the justice may think. In tracing this
very interesting history we get at the very life of the common
law; the thing that has made it more human, and therefore more
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just than any other system of known law. That is, that it is in,
of, and by, the common people; they are here making their own
law; judging their own people; trying to do justice; refusing to
suspect without reason, refusing to release or convict, to sus-
pect or to free, except at the demands of their conscience or
their common sense. And upon the decisions of these men of
the countryside rests the foundations of our law today. One
can see it growing up out of them, simple as they are. Soon a
statute grows up out of these decisions and another statute, and
by and by the great tide of case law rises from these little springs
in the hillsides and the valleys of a little country; a little land
disciplined by a conqueror of some harshness, who had followed
upon conquerors of great harshness; a very much disciplined
land, and therefore one better able to come simply to great ideas
and customs than in its later days of less self discipline. We
have become heirs of the earlier and simpler country, and we
here today enjoy the heritage of that simple custom of trying
a man or a case by the decision of the countryside. It was a
great custom, and one which has suffered, as it seems, but little
change from those early and simple days to these. The lesson
seems easy enough. Let us keep the good that has come down
to us unchanged for so many centuries until the teaching of later
centuries finds a deeper truth for which to exchange it..
Margaret C. Klingelsmith.
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